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Causation, Legal History, and Legal Doctrine
CHARLES BARZUN†
INTRODUCTION
To ask about the “opportunities for law’s intellectual
history” is, to my mind, to ask about the relationship between
two disciplines, law and history. True, that interpretation is
not compulsory since the conference organizers have wisely
not specified what such opportunities should be for. So
perhaps the field of legal intellectual history could serve as a
guinea pig for some new method of bibliographical
classification to replace the Dewey Decimal System. That
would be an “opportunity” of sorts. Presumably, though, the
aim is to stimulate thought and debate about how law’s
intellectual history may prove relevant to, and useful for
thinking about, the kinds of questions with which scholars
are currently concerned. And since the organizers and most
of the participants in the conference are law professors, and
since the conference itself took place in a law school and its
proceedings are being published in a law review, I interpret
the description of the conference to mean something like
“opportunities for showing why the intellectual history of law
is relevant to, or useful for, our thinking about law,” where
“law” is understood to refer not only to legal doctrine, but also
more broadly to “legal practice” or “legal thought” or “legal
theory” or, perhaps, “the kinds of things law professors care
about and talk about.”
With this assumption about the purpose of the
conference in mind, I offer this Paper as a friendly criticism
of what I perceive to be a trend in legal history. The trend to
which I refer is legal historians’ increasing reluctance to offer
causal explanations of past events.1 Such reluctance is
† Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. See John Henry Schlegel, Commentary, Philosophical Inquiry and
Historical Practice, 101 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2015) (observing that historians
“once had causes, but causation has fallen a bit out of style”); Christopher Tomlins
& John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal History, 1 U.C.
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understandable because the concept of “cause” is a
notoriously elusive one. It is elusive both because the concept
is used to refer to different kinds of relations between events
or states of affairs and because, even if one is precise about
which relation one means to pick out, it may be difficult to
say with certainty of any two events or states of affairs that
they in fact stand in such a relation to each other. One
cannot, after all, see, feel, hear, or touch causes. Still, I worry
that if legal historians give up any effort to offer causal
explanations of legal rules, concepts, categories, theories,
relations, distinctions, practices or understandings (let’s just
call these “legal practices or understandings”), they threaten
to undermine one of the chief ways in which they (properly,
in my view) have traditionally understood intellectual
history to be relevant to law, namely as the basis for critique
of current practice. My aim is thus to show why histories that
try to remain agnostic as to the driving causal forces in their
accounts are either insufficiently critical, insufficiently
historical, or both.
Before doing so, however, let me add a little more flesh to
my suggestion that legal historians are at risk of
undermining their own ambitions. Consider an example
drawn from a recent symposium on legal history, entitled
“Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, which
took place at U.C. Irvine in 2010.2 In their Foreword to the
symposium issue, Catherine Fisk and Robert Gordon explain
that a common feature of the papers presented there is that
the question of whether law is “something mostly determined
by external social change or itself a cause . . . that vexed so
much of legal history for a generation has been dismissed,
just as one might dismiss the debate over whether the
chicken preceded the egg.”3 Efforts to “explain causation,” the
IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2011) (describing a form of historical practice they
label “complex accumulation,” which is “postmodernist” and which “repudiates
causal explanation” on the ground that “it eschews the idea that consensus can
be established on a means of disciplining evidence”).
2. Symposium, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 519 (2011).
3. Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory
and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 525 (2011). I should
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authors observe, are mostly absent from the papers.4 And yet,
on the very same page, the authors remark that a “critical
stance” seems to be “the unanimous theoretical commitment
of these scholars.”5
The question I mean to raise is this: how much critical
bite can an historical account really have without making
(inherently controversial) claims about which things caused
which other things? The answer depends on how exactly
history might be used to critique current legal practices or
understandings. So let us take a look at a few such possible
uses.
I. IMPEACHING ARGUMENTS
One very concrete form of historical critique is the use of
history to undermine the precedential authority of a
particular court decision by showing that the court that
decided it was motivated by improper considerations,
irrelevant to the issue at hand. I’ll refer to such an argument
as an “impeaching argument” because it makes a claim about
what it takes to “impeach” a court precedent or (put another
way) to erode its legal authority.6 The claim is that when a
court decides a case on the basis of such improper
considerations, that fact undermines or impeaches its
precedential status because it shows that the background
assumption that justifies our practice of deferring to past
court decisions as a general matter—namely, that past courts
have applied the relevant legal principles in good faith—does
not hold in a particular case. If historical evidence about the
context in which the case was decided reveals that a
particular court was motivated by something else entirely,
then we no longer have good reason to treat its judgment as
authoritative.

perhaps note that Professor Gordon says in a footnote that his contribution to this
Paper took the form of “a few editorial suggestions.” Id. at 519 n.**.
4. Id. at 525.
5. Id.
6. I discuss this kind of argument at greater length in Charles L. Barzun,
Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625 (2013).

84

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Of course, any actual impeaching argument must make
a controversial judgment about what such “proper
considerations” include and exclude. Do they include, for
instance, the social, political, or economic consequences of the
decision? But right now we are concerned only with the kind
of reasoning that impeaching arguments involve, and that
reasoning is sound as long as there exist some factors that
are properly relevant to a court’s decision, and others that
are not.7
An example may help illustrate the point. In the 1996
case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme
Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited Congress from authorizing federal courts to hear
suits brought against a state by one of its own citizens.8 In
holding that the Amendment did bar Congress from
abrogating state sovereign immunity in this way, the Court
placed considerable weight on its 1890 decision, Hans v.
Louisiana, which had offered an expansive interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment.9 In dissent, Justice Souter argued,
with two other justices joining him, that Hans should not be
given precedential weight because the Hans Court only gave
the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment it did because
it feared it could not enforce its judgments in the postReconstruction South.10 Citing the work of historians, Justice
Souter described the political circumstances in which Hans
arose and concluded that “history explains, but does not
honor, Hans.”11
This kind of historical argument is controversial. Chief
Justice Rehnquist denounced Souter’s explanation of Hans
on the ground that it did a “disservice to the Court’s
traditional method of adjudication.”12 But it is controversial
7. For instance, I suspect most would agree that it would be improper for a
judge to decide a case a certain way because she would profit financially from
doing so.
8. 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996).
9. Id. at 54, 64, 76 (relying on approach taken in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890)).
10. Id. at 100, 118-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 122.
12. Id. at 68-69 (majority opinion).
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precisely because it is perceived to be a threat to the
legitimacy of its target. In other words, such an historical
argument appears to be an effective critique of a legal
authority or set of authorities.
Still, the logic of impeaching arguments depends on the
assumption that it is possible to discover why courts have
decided cases the way they did. That is, developing such an
argument requires making claims about what best explains
a given court decision. It is only because the historical
evidence suggests that what really caused the Hans Court to
decide the case the way it did was its concern for the Court’s
institutional power (not because it thought its reading of the
Eleventh Amendment was the best one) that we can draw the
inference that its precedential authority has been impeached.
So an historical account is powerless to level this kind of
critique unless it is willing to take sides, in this particular
case, on the question of whether it was the Court’s
application of the legal principles themselves, or instead
various social or political factors, that determined the
outcome.13
II. GENEALOGIES
Now it might be objected that when legal historians talk
of “critical” history, they do not have this kind of critique in
mind. In his classic article Critical Legal Histories, Professor
Robert Gordon argued that even historical approaches that
emphasize the causal importance of factors outside legal
materials in explaining legal phenomena—whether those
factors are social, political, or economic—are in some ways
still in the grip of what he called the “evolutionaryfunctionalist” view of American legal history.14 That is
because they still wrongly assume that one can identify social
“needs” or “interests” independent of the legal structures that
in part constitute those interests.15 Thus, under this view,
truly critical history is deeper and broader than the
13. Cf. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 525.
14. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 67-68
(1984).
15. Id. at 102-04.
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impeaching argument described above because it shows the
way in which our most basic legal categories and distinctions
(e.g. that between “public” and “private” realms) are both the
product of, and themselves give rise to, political and
ideological struggles among different groups.16
But we are still left with the same question: wherein lies
the critical bite? By what line of reasoning does the historical
account offered undermine or challenge the status quo?
Maybe the critique lies in revealing how many of the concepts
we commonly employ in our everyday lives and whose
meanings sometimes seem obvious and uncontroversial—
terms like “husband,” “wife,” “owner,” or “tenant”—are in fact
legal terms of art whose implications are politically
contestable—and are actually contested.17 Perhaps so, but
there is nothing distinctively historical about this kind of
critique. Presumably, the legal historian wants to argue that
the past or origins of today’s legal practices and
understandings are in some way relevant to how we should
think about them today. But how, exactly?
The most common answer is that historical accounts
expose the contingency of the unexamined assumptions of
legal practice. Once one sees how particular events and
circumstances led to today’s practices and understandings,
which to us seem so utterly normal and natural, we see that
in fact they were far from inevitable.18 The point of such
accounts is thus to show that things could have been
otherwise.19
16. See id. at 99, 101.
17. See id. at 103 (observing that “among the first words one might use to
identify the various people in an office would likely be words connoting legal
status: ‘That’s the owner over there.’”).
18. See id. at 71 (criticizing the tendency of evolutionary functionalist
historical accounts to “start explaining the whole contingent miscellany of
contemporary social practices (especially the nasty ones) as the natural outcome
of the ‘modernization process’”).
19. See Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s Legacy: American Legal History Since
1998 (Univ. Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2014-64, Nov.
2014) (endorsing the view “that contingency, is one of the major gifts that history
has to offer law: the reminder that things don’t have to look the way they do, that
there have been many options, many possibilities”).
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Here it is worth distinguishing between two implications
that the revelation of such historical contingency might
carry. The first, weaker implication is just that human
choices—not large, impersonal historical forces—determine
the course of history. This alone is sufficient to counter a
strong claim of historical determinism because it asserts that
present understandings were not literally inevitable.20 And
for just that reason, it does entail making a causal judgment.
Specifically, it asserts that human will or choice plays a
causal role in history21—hardly a vacuous claim since the
existence of genuine human agency is strongly contested in
some quarters. But this implication of contingency is still
weak in the sense that it does not alone give any reason to
doubt the value, or question the legitimacy, of the
contemporary practice in question. The defender of the
practice may always respond to such demonstrations of the
contingency of its current shape by saying, in effect,
“So what?”
For that reason, critical historians often hope that
demonstrating contingency will carry a stronger implication.
They want to say of some contemporary practice or
understanding not just that it was not necessary that it took
the shape it did but that we have reason to consider it suspect
or illegitimate in some way. And such an inference is only
warranted if the best defense of the practice depends on it
having been developed for good reasons. In other words, the
critique’s target must be the view that we should trust the
historical processes that led to some practice—perhaps
because they were democratically legitimate, or that they
involved free and open debate, or that they were the products
of good-faith experimentation and trial-and-error, or that

20. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 70 (criticizing evolutionary functionalist
history on the ground that its “working assumptions misleadingly objectify
history, making highly contingent developments appear to have been necessary”).
21. See, e.g., Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”:
The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1486 (2005) (“The civil rights doctrine we have today, the
doctrine born in education cases and grown into an anticlassification rule, was
not inevitable. It was chosen.”).
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they reflected the wisdom of those who understood what is
True and Right.
Thus, for instance, the critic may argue that our privatelaw doctrines did not develop out of man’s increasing
awareness of the value of individual autonomy; instead, they
were the product of a political and ideological struggle in
which some participants had more wealth, power, and
knowledge than did others.22 The point of such accounts is to
show that the historical factors that actually led to our
current practice are much more sinister—or, at the very
least, less well-reasoned—than we had thought. We are thus
less justified in placing our trust in their legitimacy or value
than we were prior to learning the historical account. We
might call this kind of argument a genealogical argument.23
As I hope can be seen, the logical structure of
genealogical arguments is essentially the same as that of the
impeaching arguments, discussed above. In both cases, the
argument challenges an implicit background assumption
that the process by which some practice or understanding
was produced was a reliable or healthy one.24 It purports to
show why, instead, that process was corrupted or for some
reason untrustworthy. More important, in both cases, the
force of the argument depends critically on a causal
explanation as to why some event or state of affairs—a
Supreme Court decision in the one case, the widespread
acceptance of some practice or understanding—came to be.

22. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860 (1977); Gordon, supra note 14, at 101 (“Legal forms and practices are
political products that arise from the struggles of conflicting social groups that
possess very disparate resources of wealth, power, status, knowledge, access to
armed force, and organizational capability.”).
23. For the most famous example of such an argument—indeed, the one that
probably gave “genealogy” its current, critical connotation—see Friedrich
Nietszche, 10 THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: A GENEALOGY OF MORALS 35
(Alexander Tille ed., William A. Hausemann trans., 1897) (arguing that the
dominant Judeo-Christian morality of Nietzsche’s day was the product of a “slaverevolt in morality” fueled by the resentment which the weak felt toward the
powerful).
24. Needless to say, such arguments also depend on some normative judgment
about what makes an historical process reliable or healthy.
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And that is true even of those critical legal historical
accounts that purport to show the way in which the
ideological struggles mentioned above have both caused and
been constrained by legal practices and understandings. 25
Without that causal explanation as to why our social visions
have been limited, redirected, or warped, the critique loses
all force. Hence, even if the “critical stance” endorsed by
many legal historians refers to this deeper or broader form of
critique, it still requires the historian to make claims about
which ideas, institutions, individuals or groups are most
causally responsible for making the historical phenomena
under examination what it is today.
But of course, not all historical accounts, not even all
critical ones, mean to offer genealogical arguments. So one
might object that I still have too narrow a view of what form
critical historical accounts might take. So let us look at two
other possibilities.
III. STORIES
The first of these possibilities is that writing history is
just about offering a new or different narrative. Go to a legalhistory workshop these days, and you will hear lots of talk of
stories: “People typically say that X is all about Y, but in the
story I’m telling, Z looms large”; “As I see it, your story is
about A, B and C, whereas in Joe’s story, D, E, and F are
salient.” Some of the early critical legal histories were quite
explicit in targeting a specific story about modern Western
history, which they saw as dominant. In Professor Gordon’s
words, this was a narrative of the “gradual recession of error
before the advance of commerce, liberty, and science—an
advance modestly but invaluably assisted by ever more
efficiently adaptive technologies of law.”26 According to
25. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 70 n.35 (observing, in discussing
postwar attitudes about labor-capital relations, that “[c]ritical historians treat
th[e] more or less unexamined background assumption of a relationship of social
necessity (efficient production requires legal forms preserving managerial
prerogatives) as an ideological practice that helped to produce social necessity
because it suppressed alternative methods of governing production as
unthinkable or unrealistic”) (emphasis omitted).
26. Id. at 96.
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Professor Gordon, critical historians offered competing, more
pessimistic stories, such as Professor Horwitz’s account of
nineteenth-century private law, in which the “dark side of
capitalist development” was made more visible and brought
to light.27
There is nothing wrong with stories, and it may be that
(as the word itself suggests) without some kind of narrative
structure, history ceases to be history. But even if so, we must
again ask, in what way might a story offer a critique? We
have already considered one possibility: genealogies are
certainly one kind of story—about how wicked, dumb, or
arbitrary forces (whether ideas or people or something else)
produced some seemingly “natural” state of affairs. But as
we’ve seen, such stories very much depend on offering causal
explanations. Are there stories that do not do so and yet still
offer potent critiques of current practices or understandings?
One way these stories might do so is by showing that the
relevant cast of characters is other than what people have
assumed. The emergence of civil rights law in the midtwentieth century, for instance, is not really about nine
Justices divining rights embedded in the Constitution (or
even about those same Justices advancing a liberalprogressive political agenda). It is instead about the many
civil-rights lawyers, working for the NAACP and other
organizations, who decided which cases to bring and which
ones not to bring.28 If true, this story suggests that today we
may be too focused on the Supreme Court as the primary
source of constitutional law when in fact it is the lawyers
working “on the ground” who generate many of the legal
ideas that eventually get instantiated as part of
constitutional doctrine. In this way, a particular narrative
about the development of civil-rights law serves as a kind of
critique of current attitudes, though not exactly a
genealogical one.
That is true, but as this example illustrates, what sense
can be given to the phrases “the story is about . . .” or the
“relevant cast of characters” other than causal ones? If the
Supreme Court had a sufficiently clear and specific vision of
27. Id. at 96-97.
28. See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 21.
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exactly which rights required constitutional protection,
perhaps it did not matter which cases were brought before
the Court because they would have found a way to issue the
rules they envisioned, regardless. Whether this bit of
historical speculation is right, or even plausible, is not the
point. Rather, the point is that if the above historical
narrative described is not flatly inconsistent with it, then its
critical edge is considerably dulled: the workings of lawyers
would be shown to have been relatively inconsequential in
how things turned out, so why should we think things are
different now? And yet if the narrative does entail that the
speculation is false, then that means it is making a causal
argument about what mattered to the outcome.
Another way an historical narrative might be used to
criticize existing legal practices or understandings is by
showing that while those practices might have served a
useful function once, they no longer do so today because
circumstances have changed. Although at one point, for
instance, the most important threats to free speech may have
appeared to come from governmental suppression of political
speech, these days the more serious threat comes from
corporate control over the media, which has the power to shut
out other voices entirely. Thus, because a still-dominant
theory of free speech, which grounds its protection on its
value for democracy, was developed with this older concern
in mind and is less effective at guarding against the current
threat, it should now be abandoned in favor of an autonomybased theory.29
The first thing to note about this argument is that it is
not really critical in the way that critical legal historians
originally aimed to be. Indeed, arguments of this sort seem to
29. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991). I’ve altered Professor Graber’s argument
slightly to make it a better candidate for this kind of argument. In reality, his
argument is more of a genealogical one since he suggests that the main reason
why progressive legal theorists developed the democratic theory of free speech
was that they were loathe (for political reasons) to base its defense on an
individual-rights theory that smacked of the Lochner doctrine they had spent
such energy criticizing. See Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? Zechariah
Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 269-71
(summarizing Graber’s argument).
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assume precisely the view that Professor Gordon attacked as
“evolutionary functionalism,” namely the view that legal
rules developed in response to social needs.30 No surprise,
then, that, as already noted, it is a form of historical
argument that courts standardly employ when overturning
their own precedent.31 But the more important point is that
this kind of argument still requires offering causal
explanations—albeit of a teleological sort.32 The democratic
theory of free speech only developed when it did and in the
way that it did because courts, policymakers, or citizens (for
our purposes here, it does not matter which) had a particular
understanding of what the most dire threats to free speech
were and shaped the law in line with that understanding.
No doubt there are many other kinds of historical
narratives as well, but the examples above are sufficient to
illustrate the general point that any such narrative must
make causal claims—even if only implicit ones—about which
actions produced which consequences. Consider the following
story: “One day, Jane went to school. During recess, John bit
Jane. Jane cried. The teacher asked John to apologize, which
he did. John and Jane then became friends.” Even this simple
story makes a number of implicit causal claims—that Jane
cried because she was in pain from John’s bite; that the
teacher asked John to apologize because he bit Jane; that
John apologized because the teacher asked him to; and that
the two children are friends because of John’s apology. The
lesson is obvious but important. Without making causal
judgments about what connects discrete events, history
would literally be “one damned thing after another” without
any coherent narrative at all.
At this point, one may accuse me of attacking a straw
man. No one holds so extreme a view as to insist that an
historian should never make any causal judgments of even
the basic, commonsensical sort just described. I’ll take up this
30. Gordon, supra note 14, at 63.
31. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1997) (justifying its
decision to overrule a past decision on the basis of the Court’s interest “in
recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of
accumulated experience”).
32. Some deny that teleological arguments are causal arguments at all, but I
put that issue aside here.
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objection directly below, but it may help diffuse the force of
the straw-man allegation somewhat by first considering
another kind of history that does not necessarily require
making causal claims.
IV. RESTORATIVE PROJECTS
The kind of history I have in mind is one that looks to the
past as a source of ideals and inspirations. Such histories
may look to some prior era to show that a particular set of
ideas, now forgotten, were expressed and taken seriously by
society generally, or some subset of it, with the hope that
casting such a light might encourage those today to take
those ideas seriously as well.33 Such histories are often
coupled with a genealogical story that purports to explain
why, despite its intrinsic appeal, the ideas or understandings
were nevertheless repressed, obscured, or lost.34 But they
need not be so coupled, and if they are not, such an account
does not depend, for its critical force, on any particular set of
causal inferences. Instead, the point of such an account is just
to say, “here is one way of doing things or thinking about
things that some people once highly regarded and perhaps
should be so regarded again (in place of our current
understandings).”
Again, there is nothing wrong with this kind of history
(and some of my own work may be best described in this way),
but a couple features of it warrant mention. The first is that
it is a far cry from the kind of history that the earlier
generation of critical historians sought to offer. Indeed, it is
probably most associated in the legal academy these days
with constitutional originalism, which itself is seen by many
as a conservative, even retrograde, intellectual movement.35
33. Professor Graber’s history of free speech theory is, in part (but only in part),
a restorative project of what he calls the “conservative libertarian tradition” of
free speech. See GRABER, supra note 29, at 17-50.
34. For example, Professor Graber argues that the conservative libertarian
tradition of free speech was consciously buried by political progressives who
feared that its association with Lochner-style economic rights would jeopardize
the progressive political agenda. See id. at 12.
35. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA, at xiii (2005) (characterizing originalism as
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True, this kind of history need not, and is not always,
motivated by political conservatism,36 but it is a quite
traditional form of history—one that might be better
characterized as an alternative (or even antidote) to critical
history, rather than an embodiment of it.
The more important point is that there is nothing
inherently historical about this use of history—or nothing
that makes an idea’s existence in the past of special relevance
to its value today. As described above, it involves merely
presenting an alternative picture of how things could be. Or
perhaps I should be more precise: there is nothing inherently
historical about this use of history unless one ascribes to
those who expressed or endorsed the understandings or
practices described a special kind of authority—as defenders
of originalism do, for instance, to those who drafted or ratified
the Constitution. But not only is such deference to the
authority of past actors anathema to most modern historians,
it would again depend on implicit (causal) judgments about
the true motivations of those actors who endorsed the vision.
After all, if those motivations turned out to be themselves
crassly political, economic, or ideological, deference to their
views would be vulnerable to the impeaching or genealogical
arguments described above.37

constitutional “fundamentalism,” comparing it to religious fundamentalism, and
observing that some fundamentalists seem to “approach the Constitution as if it
were inspired directly by God”).
36. The so-called “republican revival” may be an example of a left-leaning
restorative project. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1494 (1988) (endorsing and defending the “civic-republican strain in
political thought that has been identified, traced, and analyzed in much recent
writing on history, social and political theory, and American constitutionalism”).
For one of the original historical works that inspired this revival, see BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
37. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, The Constitution as a Coup Against Public
Opinion (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that “[t]he
compromises undertaken in Philadelphia also illustrate the extent to which the
Constitution was a product of clashing interests—not dispassionate political
philosophizing”).
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V. LEGAL HISTORY AND LAW
It is now time to take up directly the objection suggested
above that I am attacking a straw man. For it may be that
what legal historians resist is not so much making causal
arguments about why certain historical actors took the
actions they did, or what consequences those actions
produced; rather, what they resist is making general claims
about what the causal forces in history are in the way that
various social sciences sometimes aspire to do.38 Hence, the
authors of the Foreword quoted above acknowledge that it “is
important to explain that somebody did something to, with,
or for someone else, for identifiable reasons and with
identifiable consequences.”39 What they nevertheless
maintain is that “[l]egal history is not trying to be an
empirical social science aiming to identify a series of
variables and use the past as an experiment to prove that one
or two variables produced particular effects.”40 Under this
view, what legal historians refuse is not the demand to offer
causal explanations as such but rather the demand that they
adopt a particular theory of causal explanation according to
which to explain something is to show that it was dictated by
general laws.41
If that is the concern, then it is a well justified one, and I
take the objection to be decisive. For it seems to me that just
this difference—between, on the one hand, looking to the
historical context of a particular decision in order to explain
why it came out the way it did and, on the other, explaining
it by reference to some kind of background generalization—
does seem to mark at least one (if not the) important
38. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 75 (describing the hope that “we will be able
to generalize convincingly and fairly abstractly about what social conditions will
produce what legal responses and what effects upon society those responses will
have in their turn,” but then observing that “it’s fair to say that on the whole such
statements of regularity in legal-social relations don’t stand up very well to
historical criticism”).
39. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 525.
40. Id.
41. The locus classicus here is Carl G. Hempel, The Function of General Laws
in History, 39 J. PHIL. 35, 37 (1942) (“A set of events can be said to have caused
the event to be explained only if general laws can be indicated which connect
‘causes’ and ‘effect’ . . . .”).
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difference between the assumptions and methods of history
and those of the empirical social sciences. Thus, in my view,
legal historians, like all historians, do well to resist the
assumption that there are deterministic forces at work—
whether of a social, economic, evolutionary, or
neurobiological sort—that leave no room whatsoever for
genuine human agency to play a role in how history proceeds.
And that is true even if, as suggested above, the prevailing
view among scholars in some other academic disciplines is
that such an assumption is false.
But in closing, let me offer two observations about where
this leaves us. The first is just to emphasize the importance
of keeping distinct the two kinds of concerns about causation
distinguished above. Historians frequently talk of the
importance of “context” in understanding the past, and they
sometimes describe their work as offering “thick
descriptions.”42 And for the reasons just stated, such focus on
the particulars of the historical case seem to me well founded.
But one point of this Paper has been to call attention to the
fact that it is not at all obvious how learning the “context” of
some set of legal understandings or practices bears on how
we should evaluate it.43 There are indeed ways it might bear
on such an evaluation, and I have discussed a few of them in
an effort to highlight some of the assumptions on which they
depend. But merely describing the social, economic, or
political environment within which a practice arose is not
enough on its own to make a persuasive critique (or
endorsement) of it. Any further critical judgment depends on
42. See, e.g., Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 524 (“Whatever the terminology,
perhaps the most common and most significant methodological and theoretical
insight of these works, and the enduring insight of the ‘law and’ framework, is the
importance of context in the study of law.”) (emphasis omitted); Lowe, supra note
19 (“[I]f history offers contingency to law, it also offers concreteness, contexts for
texts and arguments, as well as the concerns of those who made them.”); see also
Gordon, supra note 14, at 125 (suggesting that one of the aims of critical history
is to offer “thickly described accounts of how law has been imbricated in and has
helped to structure the most routine practices of social life”).
43. Cf. Nicola Lacey, Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of
Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 919, 925 (2015) (stressing the importance of context for
understanding jurisprudential theories, but acknowledging that we may
“struggle to articulate the distinctively jurisprudential significance” of the
influence of H. L. A. Hart’s political and cultural context on his thought).
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inherently controversial judgments about what made (or
didn’t make)44 a causal difference to how things went in a
given context.45 So while historians are obviously free (and
should be encouraged) to offer thick descriptions of some
time-and-place for the sake of broadening our experience of
the world, if they want to offer effective critiques of a set of
legal practices and understandings, they must go beyond
description and offer explanations—or, at the very least (to
use Geertz’s own preferred term) “diagnoses”—of those
practices and understandings.46
The second point is more about law than history. Legal
historians often criticize the use of history by lawyers, judges,
and legal scholars as “law-office history.”47 Sometimes that
term is just used to describe shoddy research, anachronistic
reasoning, or strategic cherry-picking from historical
materials.48 So understood, the label is no doubt sometimes
fairly applied, but it amounts to little more than a charge of
poor historical scholarship—one that could be leveled against
some historians as well. Other times, though, the suggestion
seems to be something deeper—that when courts invoke
history, they are engaged in a fundamentally different sort of
inquiry—one that is about rationalizing the past, rather than
discovering the truth about it. Hence, the organizers of this
conference suggest in their preparatory materials that legal
doctrine may not be a topic of interest to “historians of the
44. The critical force in historians’ efforts to expose the inherent contradictions
in some area of legal doctrine lies in the suggestion that such contradictions prove
that application of the relevant legal sources did not causally determine how
courts resolved cases in that area. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); see also Gordon, supra
note 14, at 115 (“The common thread of these histories is the observation that the
contradiction makes available for the decision of every case matched pairs of
arguments that are perfectly plausible within the logic of the system but that cut
in exactly opposite directions.”).
45. And again, it also depends on a normative judgment about what a proper,
reliable, or healthy kind of historical development would look like.
46. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of
Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 27 (2000 ed. 2000).
47. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 165 (2006).
48. See id.
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sort who rightly eschew lawyers’ history as not history at
all.”49
Ironically, the same view is endorsed by lawyers who
hope to shield law from historical forms of criticism. One can
see it in the Chief Justice’s suggestion that Justice Souter’s
explanation of the Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana did
a “disservice to the Court’s traditional method of
adjudication.”50 And three decades ago, Ronald Dworkin
responded to the genealogical arguments of critical legal
historians by suggesting that they offered arguments of the
wrong sort; they offered only “genetic[ ]” arguments, whereas
what was required were “interpretive” arguments that aimed
to put past legal materials in the best light.51
Now I think this view of law and legal reasoning is
mistaken. There is, it seems to me, a deep and important
affinity between legal and historical forms of reasoning and
argument. Explanatory narratives and restoration projects of
the sort described above already play roles in courtroom
rhetoric and lawyerly argument, whether at trial or in
appellate opinions. And impeaching and genealogical
arguments, though less common in actual court practice,
share with traditional legal reasoning the assumption that
certain historical figures or historical processes, for one
reason or another, purport to be authoritative. Finally, there
is a long tradition in the common law of privileging concrete
and particular judgments over abstract and general ones. For
these reasons, critical legal history has the potential to
influence legal practices and understandings and even to
constitute what legal doctrine is.
But this is not the place to defend that large claim. The
point here is simply to suggest that when historians treat
lawyers’ use of history as not really history at all, they are
playing into the hands of those who would dismiss historical
arguments as irrelevant to the concerns of courts and
lawyers. That is, when historians accept the view (to
49. E-mail from John Henry Schlegel, Professor and Floyd H. and Hilda L.
Hurst Faculty Scholar, SUNY Buffalo Law School, to author (Nov. 3, 2013,
8:52 PM) (on file with author).
50. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996).
51. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 273 (1986).
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summarize crudely) that historians explain while lawyers
rationalize, they contribute to the diminishing significance of
history to judicial decision-making. And that diminishment
approaches a vanishing point when historians no longer even
see themselves as actually explaining how we got to where
we are.

